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¶1 In conjunction with the second annual Atrocity Crimes 
Litigation Year-in-Review (2008) Conference convened by the 
Center for International Human Rights at Northwestern University 
School of Law on January 29, 2009, the editors of the 
Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights 
invited three of the speakers to draft the articles appearing in this 
special edition. The purpose of the annual conference is to provide 
a review by practitioners and scholars of the immediately 
preceding year’s jurisprudence and practice of the leading 
international and hybrid criminal tribunals. These include the 
International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, and the War Crimes Chamber in the Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Aside from the authors described below, the 
other speakers included Chief Prosecutor Hassan Jallow of the 
Rwanda Tribunal, Chief Prosecutor Stephen Rapp of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, Deputy Prosecutor Norman Farrell of the 
Yugoslav Tribunal, International Co-Prosecutor Robert Petit of the 
Cambodia Tribunal, and former Judge Elizabeth Fahey of the 
Bosnia War Crimes Chamber. Also speaking were Jonathan 
Fanton, the President of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation, and Professors John Hagan and Stephen Kinzer of 
Northwestern University.1  
¶2 This special edition publishes outstanding articles by 
Professor Beth Van Schaack of Santa Clara University School of 
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1 The full transcript and video and audio records of the conference can be 
accessed at www.law.northwestern.edu/humanrights/events.html.   
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Law, Defense Counsel Gillian Higgins of the Yugoslav Tribunal, 
and Legal Advisor Rod Rastan of the Office of the Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court. All three authors spoke at the 
conference and further elaboration of their views can be found on 
the posted transcript.  
¶3 Professor Van Schaack served as the distinguished academic 
scholar of the conference and her article, Atrocity Crimes 
Litigation: 2008 Year-In-Review, amply demonstrates why she was 
chosen for the task.2 Van Schaack provides a tour de force of the 
jurisprudence emerging from the international criminal law (ICL) 
tribunals during the calendar year of 2008. While she notes that 
“the rate of innovation in substantive ICL is slowing 
considerably,” she recognizes that recent decisions “are 
increasingly applying established law to novel facts. ICL has thus 
begun to exhibit features of a more mature body of law with 
modern innovations happening primarily at the outer edges of 
doctrine.” She addresses several legal concepts and describes how 
the tribunals developed a better understanding of them as the year 
progressed. 
¶4 Perhaps one of the most significant characteristics of the 
atrocity crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes is the requirement that the commission of such crimes 
achieve sufficient gravity, or magnitude, before they fall within the 
jurisdiction of the ICL tribunals. Van Schaack describes how the 
Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court examined 
the gravity requirement in its consideration of whether to approve 
an arrest warrant against two defendants in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo situation before the Court. Though the rulings 
date back to 2006, the related Appeals Chamber decision of that 
year was not made available publicly until April 28, 2008, when 
the arrest warrant was unsealed. The Appeals Chamber ruled that 
war crimes, as defined in Article 8(1) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, must retain a lower threshold of 
gravity than would be expected of genocide or crimes against 
humanity. In other words, the Rome Statute affords the possibility 
of a relatively smaller magnitude of war crimes to trigger the 
Court’s jurisdiction even though there is an invitation to examine, 
“in particular,” war crimes committed “as part of a plan or policy 
                                                 
2 See Beth Van Schaack, Atrocity Crimes Litigation: 2008 Year-In-Review, 7 
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or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.” As the lead 
U.S. negotiator of the Rome Statute, I can confirm that the Appeals 
Chamber preserved the original intent of the negotiators. Indeed, 
the United States originally wanted to make the high threshold 
requirement mandatory for war crimes in the Rome Statute but 
most of its NATO allies countered that to do so would leave the 
erroneous impression that there was a high bar for any prosecution 
of violations of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
which are a key part of Article 8. The negotiators concluded that 
the “in particular” language was most appropriate as it suggested 
the importance of prosecuting war crimes of considerable gravity 
but did not make it an automatic requirement for jurisdiction. 
 The Appeals Chamber also rejected the remarkably narrow 
view of the Pre-Trial Chamber in describing the categories of 
perpetrators who may be prosecuted before the Court. Rather than 
focus only on the most senior leaders involved in the situation 
under investigation and those most capable of preventing the 
commission of atrocity crimes, the Appeals Chamber allowed that 
“individuals who are not at the very top of an organization may 
still carry considerable influence and commit, or generate the 
widespread commission of, very serious crimes.” As Van Schaack 
writes, “the Appeals Chamber appropriately refocused the gravity 
inquiry on qualitative rather than quantitative factors, ensuring 
flexibility in pursuing cases and enhancing the deterrent power of 
the Court.”  
¶5 Van Schaack examines principles of military necessity, 
proportionality, and distinction in the prosecution of war crimes 
during 2008. The Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav Tribunal 
largely affirmed the Trial Chamber’s findings in the Martić case, 
namely that the defendant’s order to use twelve M-87 Orkan 
rockets containing cluster bomb warheads against Zagreb 
constituted a widespread attack against the civilian population and 
was per se an indiscriminate attack notwithstanding the presence 
of any lawful military targets. The Appeals Chamber ruled that 
Milan Martić knew how such shelling could result in deadly injury 
to civilians and that it could not be viewed as a lawful reprisal or as 
self-defense.  
¶6 In the Strugar case before the Yugoslav Tribunal, the 
Appeals Chamber confirmed the standards for what constitutes a 
victim’s direct participation in hostilities: the prosecution must 
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show beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time of the injury, the 
victim was not committing “acts of war which by their nature or 
purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel or 
equipment of the enemy’s armed forces.” Van Schaack recites the 
interesting distinction made by the Appeals Chamber in what does 
and does not constitute direct participation in hostilities as well as 
the indirect participation that would not deny a civilian his or her 
civilian immunity from attack. The Appeals Chamber emphasized 
the case-by-case analysis required in determining a civilian’s 
status. 
¶7 In a judgment of critical importance to how the United States 
and other governments should evaluate the fight against terrorism 
within the context of warfare and the law of war, the Yugoslav 
Tribunal determined in the Boškoski case that an armed conflict 
existed in Macedonia in 2001 even though so-called terrorist acts 
occurred within the context of other armed engagements. The Trial 
Chamber ruled that what matters is “whether acts are perpetrated in 
isolation or as part of a protracted campaign that entails the 
engagement of both parties in hostilities. It is immaterial whether 
the acts of violence perpetrated may or may not be characterized as 
terrorist in nature.” Therefore, isolated acts of terrorism may not 
reach the threshold of armed conflict, but “when there is protracted 
violence of this type, especially where [the acts] require the 
engagement of the armed forces in hostilities, such acts are 
relevant to assessing the level of intensity with regard to the 
existence of an armed conflict.” Van Schaack also describes how 
the Trial Chamber sets forth factors that need to be considered in 
determining the organizational character of an armed group (that 
might also be viewed as a terrorist group) and thus, its relevance to 
law of war categorization and analysis. 
¶8 The ICL tribunals addressed many other key issues that Van 
Schaack reviews in her article. These include how the Appeals 
Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone clarified and 
strengthened the crime of recruiting child soldiers and, in a 
“landmark opinion,” established the crime of forced marriage as an 
“Other Inhumane Act” among crimes against humanity. By 
contrast, she writes, gender justice received setbacks when (a) the 
Yugoslav Tribunal refused to permit the Prosecution to amend the 
indictment in the Lukić case to include crimes of rape, torture, and 
enslavement allegedly committed within a rape camp established 
by the defendants, and (b) the Rwanda Tribunal acquitted 





Tharcisse Muyunyi on rape charges in his trial after witnesses 
could not be traced or refused to testify, leaving only witnesses 
who were not raped by the specific group of subordinates led by 
Mujunyi, even though their testimony was judged to be reliable by 
the Trial Chamber.  
¶9 In the Martić case, the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav 
Tribunal ruled that the Prosecution could not expand the term 
“civilian” in the definition of crimes against humanity to include 
hors de combat combatants, but also held that not every victim of a 
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population must 
be a civilian. Indeed, some hors de combat combatants could be 
victims of crimes against humanity.  Maintaining the legal 
distinction between civilians and hors de combat combatants 
remains essential, however.  Van Schaack writes that in the Civil 
Defense Forces case, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone confirmed that an attack against a civilian 
population can still provide the predicate for crimes against 
humanity charges even where “the ultimate objective of the 
fighting force was legitimate and/or aimed at responding to 
aggressors.” In fact, there can be co-existing attacks of differing 
legal consequence: one directed against a civilian population 
alongside one targeting opposing forces. 
¶10 Van Schaack concludes her article by reviewing the many 
developments in the law governing forms of liability in ICL cases, 
including joint criminal enterprise, superior responsibility, co-
perpetration, conspiracy, and chains of liability. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the Cambodia Tribunal wrestled with the Co-
Prosecutors’ attempt to establish a joint criminal enterprise in its 
charges against Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch) and ultimately 
rejected its use, setting up an appeal that reached into 2009. The 
interesting issue will be whether, on appeal, the Cambodia 
Tribunal finds that joint criminal enterprise theory existed in the 
late 1970’s as a theory of responsibility. The outcome also will 
have profound influence on the imminent joint trial of four other 
suspects.  
¶11 In the Hadžihasaović case before the Yugoslav Tribunal, the 
Appeals Chamber determined, in Van Schaack’s description, “that 
there was no customary international law basis to hold a superior 
liable for the crimes of his or her subordinates when such crimes 
are committed prior to the superior assuming his or her position of 
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command.” This finding (as well as the subsequent Orić judgment) 
elicited strong dissenting views by three judges and Van Schaack 
joins them when she argues, “The Hadžihasanović decision is 
wrong as a matter of law, flawed as a matter of logic, and counter-
productive as a matter of policy.” She believes that “it manifests all 
of the grounds recognized by courts all over the world for 
overturning prior precedent, notwithstanding the imperatives of 
predictability and stability guaranteed by stare decisis.” 
¶12 Defense Counsel Gillian Higgins provides a reality check in 
her article, The Impact of the Size, Scope, and Scale of the 
Milosevic Trial and the Development of Rule 73bis before the 
ICTY.3 Slobodan Milosevic died in 2006 before the Yugoslav 
Tribunal reached judgment on the sixty-three counts against him in 
three indictments. But enough time now has transpired for a sober 
assessment of how his trial was conducted and how indictments 
and procedures of the ICL tribunals could be improved in the 
future. Higgins describes the evolution of the indictments against 
Milosevic and makes a compelling argument for why the Appeals 
Chamber probably got it wrong when it ordered that the three 
indictments pertaining to atrocity crimes in Kosovo, Croatia, and 
Bosnia, respectfully, “be tried together on the basis that the acts 
alleged therein formed part of the same transaction.” If the Kosovo 
indictment, for example, had been prosecuted alone and perhaps 
first, there would have been a better chance that judgment could 
have been reached on at least one set of alleged crimes within a 
reasonable period of time, which, in retrospect, we can safely 
speculate would have occurred while Milosevic remained alive.  
¶13 The long and ultimately dismissed Milosevic trial, with its 
many delays, excursions into procedural disputes, and finally the 
death of the defendant, had the positive effect, Higgins contends, 
of increasing judicial powers under Rule 73bis of the Yugoslav 
Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence to control the 
presentation of the prosecution’s case. Armed with various 
amendments to Rule 73bis, including one approved two months 
after Milosevic’s death, the judges can better manage the number 
of witnesses and time allotted to each, the number of crime sites or 
incidents that are relevant for the presentation of evidence, the 
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number of counts which the Prosecutor can charge in the 
indictment, and the Prosecutor’s selection of counts upon which to 
proceed. The Prosecutor, not surprisingly, has objected to how 
Rule 73bis is being applied by the judges as it tends to replace their 
reasoning for his on how to prosecute the charges against the 
defendant.   
¶14 One interesting consequence, however, is a diminution of the 
historical record. I find it shortsighted how the Trial Chamber in 
the Stanisic case simply concluded that “the Tribunal was 
established to administer justice, and not to create a historical 
record.” Tell that to the victims and to later generations of 
Bosnians, Croatians, and Serbs. There has traditionally been a 
balancing act in the ICL tribunals to ensure that a reasonable 
record of historical value is recorded while rendering justice fairly, 
including protection of the rights of the defendant under 
international standards of due process. Being cavalier about the 
historical record, which the prosecution has the ability to bring to 
the forefront of the trial for good reason, undercuts those judges in 
the ICL tribunals who acknowledge the historical record’s unique 
value.  
¶15 Nonetheless, Higgins presents the reader with a fascinating 
“what if” scenario on the Milosevic trial that should better inform 
how large, complex, and politically controversial atrocity crimes 
trials could be better managed. There likely will be many of them 
before the International Criminal Court and, as Higgins notes, 
already its Prosecutor appears to be applying some lessons from 
the Milosevic case by narrowly framing his indictments (a good 
example being the Lubanga case).  
¶16 In his article, Review of ICC Jurisprudence 2008, Rod 
Rastan provides his own perspective at the International Criminal 
Court on some of the same issues raised by Van Schaack.4 On 
modes of liability, Rastan examines two Pre-Trial Chamber 
decisions on confirmation of charges in 2008 and concludes that “a 
distinct path for identifying the responsibility of principals among 
a plurality of perpetrators” is being forged by the Court. Because 
Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute is a more detailed and codified 
treatment of individual criminal responsibility than has been the 
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RTS. 261 (2009). 
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experience of the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, the joint 
criminal enterprise theory developed by the latter tribunals will not 
translate easily or entirely to the International Criminal Court. 
Although the control of the crime theory may be helpful as a 
doctrinal guide to liability before the Court, Rastan postulates that 
it may need to evolve either with more flexible types of 
organizational structures in mind or with a broader framework for 
principal liability. For example, he questions why the common 
purpose doctrine of Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute is 
necessarily viewed as a secondary form of liability that eschews 
leadership crimes.  
¶17 The highest profile litigation of 2008 before the International 
Criminal Court was the Lubanga case where the non-disclosure of 
documents obtained under conditions of confidentiality (Article 
54(3)(e) of the Rome Statute) slammed head-on into the 
Prosecutor’s duty to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence 
(Article 67(2) of the Rome Statute). Rastan expertly explains that 
the Appeals Chamber resolved the controversy by essentially 
allowing the confidentiality privilege to trump the disclosure duty 
regarding exculpatory evidence, but with a heavy dose of caveats 
and guidelines that should prove very useful in future litigation.   
¶18 Rastan’s discussion of victims’ participation in cases 
highlights the ruling of the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga on July 
11, 2008, namely that the harm alleged by a victim and his or her 
personal interest in a particular case must be linked with the 
charges confirmed against the accused. This and other judgments 
of the Appeals Chamber “will have a significant impact in shaping 
the contours of victims’ participation in future trial proceedings,” 
he writes. Finally, Rastan provides an interesting summary of how 
the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court has 
reaffirmed the prohibition on “witness proofing” by the 
prosecution despite the common practice of this procedure by the 
Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals. He argues in favor of the Court 
drawing its own procedural roadmap “rather than a fortiori 
whether it can be discerned from principles and rules of 
international law or general principles of law derived from national 
laws of legal systems of the world.”  
¶19 This special edition of the Journal, inspired by the Atrocity 
Crimes Litigation Year-in-Review (2008) Conference, makes a 
significant and timely contribution to a better understanding of the 
ICL tribunals and their influence on the substantive development 





of international criminal law. I suspect the year 2009 and what 
transpires at Northwestern University School of Law shortly 
thereafter to record the evolution of the ICL tribunals will prove no 
different. 
 
